Haig one

I recently acquired, for the rather large sum of £20, a copy of Duff Cooper's two volume biography of Haig, a book of which I had been aware for a while but had never got around to.

From a sale at Epsom Library, a nicely printed hardback from Faber, which must have been much read over the years as it has been rebound in library blue by Riley, Dunn & Wilson of reference 1. A pretty good job except that some of the pages are now slightly crooked and some of the sewing is more visible than it ought to be. However, read just three times in the last 15 years or so, so perhaps Surrey Libraries did not time their rebinding very well.

As it happens, my mother had a copy of Duff Cooper's wife's three volumes of memoirs, which I then had for many years, unread, eventually culled. I am fairly sure that I also once owned Duff Cooper's own memoirs 'Old Men Forget', also culled, quite possibly unread. And then I once owned their son's (John Julius Norwich) three volume history of Byzantium, both read and culled.

This post to notice my completion of the first volume. An easy read, if it was also easy to get lost in the maze of names of places and units. Much better maps would have been helpful.

Born in 1861, the youngest of the many offspring of the inventor of Haig whisky. I have not yet found any mention of his contemporary Mrs. Greville, the heiress of the inventor of McEwan's Export, another Scot who made it to the top of the social scene down south, helped along by money from trade. Known to us as the castellan of Polesden Lacey and as a very good friend to Osbert Sitwell, both much noticed in previous posts.

Not thought to be clever but nevertheless passed through Oxford and Sandhurst to join the cavalry, spending a lot of his time there being very good at polo. But he must have been able in other ways, because serving in India, the Sudan and the South African war he rose rapidly, making general officer rank in time for the first world war and becoming commander in chief of the British expeditionary forces at the end of 1915.

I finished the book with a much better opinion of the first world war generals than I started. They did what they could with the men and weapons available. Avoiding, stopping or otherwise curtailing the dreadful slaughter was a job for the politicians not the generals.

The slaughter of the Battle of the Somme being one of the charges against him. In his defence, Duff Cooper points out first that the battle was fought to take the pressure off the French at Verdun, who might otherwise have collapsed - and while a peace on German terms in 1916 might have been better than what happened 30 years later, it might not have been that great. Second, that the time and place was of French choosing. Third, that while the slaughter was dreadful, what we bought for that slaughter was the destruction of the German army, which might have fought on for another two years, but was never the same again. An opinion which I believe has become fashionable once again.

I associated to remarks in Churchill's book about Marlborough, to the effect that Marlborough believed that to win, you had to smash the main force of the enemy, probably by frontal attack. Costly, but effective, certainly in the run up to Blenheim. In the present case the main force of the enemy was in France and Belgium and footling about in the eastern Europe or the Near East was beside the point and a waste of scarce resources.

I was reminded that, certainly up to the end of 1916, the war was much more a French affair than a British affair. They had a far bigger army in the field, it was their country and they called the shots. Leaving Haig to play a tricky game between the French, his army boss back in London, his political bosses back in London and what he thought should actually be done. Duff Cooper passes on a few harsh words from Haig about politicians who talk well in committee but who know nothing and who, all too often, got their mistaken way.

There was an interesting illustration of the limits of his power. Some time before the Somme, Haig had heard of a new infantry tactic which involved crossing open ground in short bursts, rather than in long lines spread out across a long front. He tried to persuade his generals to give it a go, but failed and did not feel able to press the matter. In the event, the new infantry tactic became the norm rather later on, after many long lines had been mown down.

I was struck by the number of generals who were killed, certainly up to the end of 1916. This in contradiction to a claim that I had once heard that no-one above the rank of major had been killed. All the senior officers were safe, sipping good claret in their châteaux behind the lines. On at least one occasion, careless copy from a journalist resulted in such a château being shelled, with many of its occupants being killed. Killing their generals was always a good way to disrupt the enemy and both sides did as much of it as they could manage. None of this Wellington nonsense at Waterloo of it being none of his business to take pot shots at Napoleon.

But I do remember that I tried to check this claim, which I did not believe, and completely failed to turn up any statistics about casualties by rank. Perhaps I would do better if I tried now.

I was also struck by how old many of the generals were, with a lot of them being well over sixty, perhaps inevitable given the long period of relative peace which had preceded the first world war. But far too old to be able to cope with the work load and responsibility of a general in war time. In which connection I was interested to read that one of the ways that Haig coped was by attending Divine Service (Scottish variety) and taking his prayers seriously. Which I might not approve of, but what other crutch had he got to lean on, in the circumstances of the time? Neither drink nor drugs would have been very good alternative plans.

Finally, following the read noticed at reference 2, it was interesting to read here of the Indian Army furnishing one of the half dozen or so army corps in the field at the end of 1914. With an army corps at the time being two or three divisions, perhaps 50,000 men in all. There was also a splendid anecdote about what I assume was a Sikh general, another cavalry man, asking his chum Dougie when they going to able to have a proper charge. I believe all the combatants on the western front kept some cavalry ready and waiting for that opportunity for the duration. While those on the eastern front actually got to use theirs.

PS: later: I think the unread qualifier to 'Old Men Forget' is probably correct. Diligent search of the blog reveals just the irrelevant reference 4.

Reference 1: http://www.rdw.co.uk/.

Reference 2: http://psmv3.blogspot.co.uk/2018/01/partition.html.

Reference 3: 'Old men forget'. King Henry V, Act IV, Scene III.

Reference 4: http://pumpkinstrokemarrow.blogspot.co.uk/search?q=Diana+Duff-Cooper.