It's a chip's life

The purpose of the present note is to update the story told at reference 1. The story we are telling now suggests that consciousness is the result of activity in a small sheet of neurons, maybe a few centimetres square, supporting the data structure described at reference 2 and elsewhere. With the rather diffuse cloud of consciousness of reference 1 being boiled down to something much smaller here.

We suppose that, for the sake of the story, this small sheet of neurons has been implemented on a chip, maybe not that much bigger than the chip that one puts into mobile phones.

This chip is supported by a large amount of other machinery, machinery which is certainly necessary but not, on this hypothesis, sufficient. Machinery which keeps the host ticking over, machinery which feeds the chip its data, the stimulation it needs to make it buzz. Machinery which includes all those networks criss-crossing the brain, zones B, C, E and F in the illustration, networks with essential supporting roles, but not the starring role. Note also the privileged access of the nose to the lower brain; all other electrical input is to the brain stem and spinal cord.

All this energy needs to be brought to a focus on our chip for there to be that buzz of consciousness. Perhaps analogous to bringing enough energy into focus inside a tokomak for there to be a sustained fusion reaction in a small and safe compass (see, for example, reference 3). Perhaps also analogous to a fighter plane: a small plane which needs a big organisation behind it to get it into the air.

With the subjective experience still being thought of as a complex electrical field of some sort, but now in the immediate vicinity of the chip, most likely not visible from the outside. A field which only exists because of a lot of synchronised activity being concentrated in a small space. But with the underlying data structure, which we have described elsewhere, being the way in.

Which adds up to, rather than a frontal attack on other theories of consciousness, something quite modest added to the sharp end. The chip is the fighter plane, mentioned above, while the other theories are the organisation. You need both to deliver any fighting.

Where is it?

It seems unlikely that such a chip would live in the cerebral cortex. The upper brain stem or the lower brain seems much more likely – not least because we suspect that there are animals, perhaps humans, without a much of a cerebral cortex but who are, nevertheless, conscious – with some authors (see, for example, reference 6) pushing the dawn of consciousness, at least of a sort, back hundreds of millions of years; after the invention of sight but a very long time before the invention of language. We do not think that the linking of consciousness to something called unlimited associative learning in reference 6 is consistent with the chip proposed here, but, nevertheless, our working assumption that there is just one way to do consciousness, which would be much the same in a frog as in a chimpanzee – if it were to turn out that frogs were at least somewhat conscious. Not much doubt in my mind about chimpanzees.

We note in passing that some people see a role in all this for the claustrum, a couple of thin sheets of grey matter, one on each side of the structures grouped between the top of the brain stem and the cerebral cortex. Maybe a home for our chip.

It seems quite possible that the position of the chip is not completely fixed; maybe all that is needed is some part of a larger area, rather as one might allocate part of a large disc file to a small, logical file, according to the needs and circumstances of the moment. But much less likely that it could wander about the cerebral cortex.

What happens if it is damaged or missing?

We have left aside the question of whether consciousness is for anything. If we suppose that it is not for anything, that it is just some accidental feature arising from the development of nervous systems more generally, just removing the chip, rather as one might take the sim card out of a mobile phone, should just remove consciousness, without affecting the behaviour or functioning of the host. Your best friend might be one such, a zombie, and at the present state of the art you would never know. The zombie would score well on tests like the Glasgow Coma Scale. See reference 7.

Alternatively, one might see the chip as a pipe with some interesting properties, a way-station rather than a terminus, removal of which disrupts something else. The chip has a function of sorts, albeit only the passing-on of signal rather than something more positive. But a passing-on which is essential – in which case removal of the chip will damage behaviour and function to that extent..

Alternatively again, consciousness is necessary for, or at least is strongly associated with, something more positive and has been the subject of positive selection over evolutionary time, a view to which we incline (see references 4 and 5), in which case removal of the chip will again damage behaviour and function to that extent, but probably leaving management of essential bodily functions more or less intact. Leaving the person concerned in some grey area between being a small child again, sleepwalking and normal adult life.

Is there only one of them?

Computer systems quite often do things more than once. For example, there may be two computers, two computers in two quite different places, supporting the use of Visa payment cards in the UK. Two systems which both do the necessary and the loss of either one of which could be tolerated without interruption or reduction of service. Less grand, a computer system for an insurance company might maintain two copies of its important data in parallel. Two complete optical storage arrays at two quite different locations. With tricky protocols to ensure that they stay up-to-date and in-step.

It is not impossible that the brain has this sort of redundancy in the present connection. After all, there is plenty of redundancy in other parts of the body. One has, for example, two eyes, while one can manage, albeit with some loss of function, with one. One has two kidneys, while one is enough. And there is quite a lot of redundancy in the pipework which carries the blood about, for example to and from the various parts of the colon.

Conclusions

We have set out our stall for consciousness being something which is implemented within a small compass. With the large-scale brain networks being uncovered by the likes of the EU and the US brain projects being necessary but not sufficient.

With the purpose of the stall being to provide some context for the other papers of the srb series.

Footnotes 

A SIM card is a plastic card in a mobile phone that contains your personal information and that allows you to use the phone.  Otherwise a small card containing the Subscriber Identity Module, used in a mobile phone to store data about the network, telephone number, etc. These days SIM cards come in three sizes: standard SIM (15 x 25mm); micro SIM (12 x 15mm); and, nano SIM (8.8 x 12.3mm).

The Chinese quite probably have a brain project too. But we have not yet come across it.

References

Reference 1: http://psmv2.blogspot.co.uk/2015/08/its-dogs-life.html.

Reference 2: http://psmv3.blogspot.co.uk/2017/03/seeing-red-rectangles.html.

Reference 3: https://www.iter.org/.

Reference 4: http://psmv3.blogspot.co.uk/2016/09/what-is-consciousness-for.html.

Reference 5: http://psmv3.blogspot.co.uk/2016/09/consciousness-of-choice.html.

Reference 6: The Transition to Minimal Consciousness through the Evolution of Associative Learning - Zohar Z. Bronfman, Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka – 2016.

Reference 7: http://www.glasgowcomascale.org/.

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